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The State as Banker and Entrepreneur
The Last-Resort Character of the Mexican State's Economic Intervention, Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe* There is a growing body of evidence to demonstrate that the Mexican state that was consolidated in the wake of the Mexican Revolution deliberately created and has continued to nurture a national bourgeoisie which has been a major force in the spectacular economic growth (the "Mexican miracle") of the past four decades, growth that has had little or no benefit for-indeed some argue was built on the backs of-the Mexican lower classes.' And yet, paradoxically, the capitalists that have so benefited rarely view the activities of the Mexican state with more than suspicion, and often portray it as their principal enemy--or perhaps not so surprisingly. Hardly limiting itself to mere infrastructure investments or the provision of investment incentives, the Mexican state has itself emerged as the major banker and entrepreneur in the economy. Its own enterprises have preempted private-sector savings to finance public investment; they have closed off opportunities for private investment; and they enjoy special advantages in sectors where public and private forms compete. Even in comparison with other major Latin American countries, the Mexican state has been atypically and forcefully interventionist in its national economy, particularly with regard to the scope of its involvement in the manufacturing sector. 2 These two seemingly opposed views of the Mexican state are both factually accurate and reconcilable under the following thesis: Following on the Revolution, the Mexican state came to take on the role of making capitalism work for Mexico , and, in the context of Mexico's being a dependent, late-starting industrializer, this task required, for any degree of success, both major restrictions on the demands of the lower classes and the forceful entry of the state into areas of the economy where the private sector was unwilling or unable to enter, or had entered and failed. The central question of this article addresses part of this thesis: Why has the state emerged as the major banker and entrepreneur in complished in Great Britain through the exertions of individual capitalists, later industrializers (such as France and Germany) required investment banks for the same purpose, and those embarking still later (such as Russia) needed the still more powerful institutional means of the state itself-its taxation powers-to generate the needed investment capital.
Gerschenkron focused his attention on industrialization in Europe, but, in the dependent context of Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the dynamics of late, late industrialization have been somewhat different. In these countries, industrialization initially focused not on producer goods, but rather on formerly imported consumer goods through a process of import-substitution originally forced on these countries by depressions and wars in the developed capitalist world.5 Even more than for the late industrializers of Europe, this late, late industrialization has set certain problems for these Latin American countries which their private sectors have been unable or unwilling to meet and solve. The problems are greater in scope and character for a number of reasons. Products and processes are more sophisticated, and the necessary technology not only expensive (if the owners--often transnational corporations-are willing to sell), but also almost impossible to develop domestically with available talent. The problem of being competitive with production methods utilized elsewhere in the world is not simply a concern for export production, but also for the domestic market because of the penetration of these countries by capital from the more industrialized countries. Labor in these late, late industrializers is often better organized to make good its demands for a sizable share of the profits than was the case with the first industrializers. These problems (and of course there were others) were exacerbated in Mexico by the devastation of the Revolution, which extended through much of the second decade of this century. Mexico emerged from the Revolution without an entrepreneurial class capable of leading industrialization; consequently, a need arose for special institutional arrangements to confront and solve the problems of late, late industrialization. As Gerschenkron found in Europe, we find in Mexico (and to a certain extent in other Latin American countries) that state institutions have come to meet these problems. Our basic 166 This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 24 Aug 2017 21:04:59 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms contention regarding the role of the state in the political economy of Mexico (although only limited evidence can be provided in this article) can be stated as follows: (1) The Mexican state has taken on the task of making capitalism work for Mexico; by (2) placing primary reliance on the private sector, promoting and strengthening it to lead the way in rapid economic growth; but (3) the state has stood ready to intervene in the economy as an institution of last resort, though sometimes an impatient one, acting as banker and as entrepreneur to deal with those problems that the private sector has been unwilling or unable to handle, or has tried to handle but failed.6
Gerschenkron's argument about the role of the state in industrialization in situations of relative backwardness can thus be extended to cover the case of
Mexico-and will prove revealing. But, before proceeding, we should briefly take note of an incompleteness that his account has when considered as description, and an even more serious flaw that it has when considered as explanation.
His account is limited as a description because its central terms must be filled in historically. The conceptions of "problem," "last resort," and "inability" (or "unwillingness") have objective and subjective moments. The trajectory of growth-the mode of production in its fullest sense-throws up specific difficulties at particular points in time. But the manner in which these difficulties are defined as problems, the way in which the state's responsibility for solving them comes to be conceived, the recognition of the unwillingness or inability of private-sector actors, the judgment that no other solution can be found except by resort (last resort) to the instrumentality of the state-all these must be understood in light of the conceptualizing orientations of state institutions and leaders. And these orientations, in turn, change as problems are defined and confronted, as learning takes place, as generations and administrations change.
How Gerschenkron's account is flawed as an explanation may be noted simply by recognizing its functionalist or teleological character. Adducing that the inability of private-sector actors to solve the problems of late, late industrialization creates "needs" for action by the state does not explain why (still less how) the state acts to fulfill these needs. Such a functionalist explanation fails to account for the will (or lack of will) of the state to undertake to meet these needs and also fails to account for the state'spower successfully (or unsuccessfully) to cope with these needs.
This article seeks to extend and develop Gerschenkron's suggestive approach. Looking historically at the Mexican case, we will endeavor to explain how the conceptions of "problem" and "last resort" have come to take on the meaning they have, and how the state created the power necessary to intervene directly in the economy. We will focus particular attention on the problem of the will or "orientations" of the state. We will enlarge and substantiate this general argument principally through a discussion of a few of the more paradigmatic instances of state intervention.' In a conclusion, we will seek to clarify the conception of the state that is being developed here, and we will address some issues concerning the changing relations of public and private sectors in Mexico.
Reconstituting the State, 1917-40 If the proximity to the United States had allowed a foreign domination which rankled, it also put before the eyes of these Sonorans the image of a modem, rapidly developing country. Beyond political consolidation, their primary concern was with economic growth, and the model to be copied was the capitalist system to the north with its dramatic successes in industrialization and in large-scale commercial argiculture. It is important to remember that no noncapitalist model existed to be copied-Russia's path was still uncertain--but it is more important that the Sonoran constitutionalists had no inclinations to socialism (and that no other social class forces pushed strongly in that direction). Still, the decision to reintegrate Mexico into the world capitalist economy left open a choice of routes. If the United States was to be the model for development, that was much more so in the sense of showing the shape and extent of what could be achieved than in the sense of showing a precise route to be followed. Among the alternatives available were a minimalist, laissez-faire state that would leave the speed and direction of growth to the private sector, and the Porfirian model of growth through active encouragement of foreign capital. The latter had just been rejected, however, and the former presumed the existence of the sort of national bourgeoisie that had led development in the United States and which was still nascent in Mexico take on those tasks that the private sector was unable or unwilling to do. In the early 1920s, these orientations came to be firmly embedded in the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda), and this ministry rapidly became the most powerful in the state apparatus (a position that has only recently been challenged). Indeed, the Mexican state during this early postrevolutionary period was, effectively, the president, the Finance Ministry, and the financial institutions around it (the Bank of Mexico, Nacional Financiera, etc.). The power of these financial institutions inside the state apparatus stemmed in part from Mexico's decision to abide by the rules of the world capitalist political economy: they were the institutions charged with stabilizing the currency, renegotiating debts, guaranteeing foreign loans, taxation, and control over budgetary allocation of these funds. Although such actions required presidential consultation and approval, these financial institutions have been nearly (again, until recently) the sole source of well-trained economists in Mexico. Beneath these changes in orientation ran a deep continuity, however. The Revolution had brought to the surface a series of radical demands or goals: for land redistribution, for recovery of national patrimony from foreigners, for substantial improvement in the terms of life for urban and rural lower classes. These radical goals did not coalesce into a coherent ideology, still less into a strategy for development. While these goals continued to be articulated by the revolutionary family, the strategy of economic development that came to be adopted, its guiding intelligence in the Finance Ministry, was one that saw these goals being pursued only insofar as they could be by-products of a certain kind of economic growth in which primary reliance would be placed on the private sector.
The common outlook among the middle-and high-level tecnicos in th institutional complex demarcated by the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Mexic and Nacional Financiera can be traced, to a large extent, to an in-house trainin program developed in the Bank of Mexico by Gonzalo Robles and Daniel Cosio
Villegas and administered for a number of years by Robles. As a young man h had been a member of Carranza's retinue; he had studied engineering in th United States; and he had been centrally involved in the reorganization of th banking system. For a time, under Cardenas, he was director general of th Bank of Mexico, moving later to become director of a new office in the bank the department of industrial studies, from which he coordinated the trainin program. Promising young people were brought into the bank for a few years sent off to foreign countries (often the United States) for graduate study, then returned for final shaping under Robles's careful attention. The orientation they received was the one we have already discussed: economic independence from the colossus to the north, industrialization, the importance of a middle class primary reliance on the private sector, and the need for vigorous action by th state to create the conditions for private-sector investment and to do what th private sector would not or could not."4
Placing such primary reliance on the private sector ran into immediate difficulties. The national bourgeoisie was small and weak, and often disinclined to make long-term capital investments, preferring instead real estat speculation, commercial credit, jewelry, and the like. The only alternative, particularly if foreign investment was not to be encouraged, was state activity t foster the growth of a national bourgeoisie and to promote the kinds o conditions under which it would be inclined to invest. Major infrastructur investments in road building and in irrigation began in the mid-1920s. But nowhere was the early orientation of the state to be seen so clearly as in it actions to create a strong financial sector, and the consequences of its action here defined the terms of much of what would happen later.
Mexico faced nearly total financial collapse following the Revolution. Paper currency was worthless, most of the private banks were in ruins, and the country's standing in international financial circles had fallen so low that further credits were unobtainable. Calles and his finance minister saw the reorganization and resuscitation of a private banking system as a critical first step Commerce Bank, the Small Merchant's Bank, and, most importantly, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). The postrevolutionary leaders had come to define a strong, development-oriented banking system as a critical need, and state intervention as legitimate when the private sector was unable or unwilling to act. The particular kinds of public-sector banks needed were defined by more specific historical factors: the sectors earmarked to lead growth, and the needs and demands of the groups and classes that constituted the social foundations of the postrevolutionary Mexican state. 15 Slowly, responding to the ministrations of the state, the private banking system began to grow, as well, in terms of assets and in terms of institutional Mexico' s economists conceived of a total network of economic institutions and processes necessary to complete the structure they were creating, and if the private sector could not supply these, it seemed the obligation of the state to do so, in the interests of the private sector itself.t"
Under the Cardenas regime , there were important state economic interventions in nonbanking areas: the state became the major or sole owner in the light and power industry, the railroads, and the petroleum industry. In each of these cases, however, it was foreign private investment that was being challenged by the state; the intervention was spurred either by serious bottlenecks, that were being created by foreign reticence to make needed investments (light and power, railroads), or challenges to the sovereignty of the Mexican state (oil companies); and in each of the cases it would have been difficult for private Mexican investors to solve the problems because of high risks, large initial investments, and long-term horizons on profits.19 The much stronger action that Cirdenas was able to take toward foreign investment than Calles, and Cirdenas's distinctive exercise of political power on behalf of the workers and peasants, should not be allowed to obscure the strong continuity with regard to the state's role in the economy. Nothing is so important in explaining this continuity as the continuity of personnel in key The decades of the 1920s and 1930s had been ones of political and economic reconstruction in Mexico. The foundations were laid in those years for the surge of industrialization that began in the 1940s, and that was to be sustained into the 1970s. The Great Depression, in decreasing the volume of world trade, had provided some stimulation for domestic production of consumer goods in Mexico, and World War II added to the insulation of the domestic market from imports the possibility of exports to the United States. Guided by its orientation toward primary reliance on the private sector, the Mexican state (or, more properly, the "effective" state centered around the president, the Treasury, and public financial institutions) acted to encourage the private sector to respond to the possibilities created by these changes in the international political economy. In 1947, the war-induced protection of local industries over, the government implemented a scheme of tariffs and quotas to sustain the import substitution industrialization into which circumstances had already maneuvered Mexico. 174 This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 24 Aug 2017 21:04:59 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
The assistance of the government to the private sector took an array of forms:
financing for new businesses through its development banks, basic infrastructure facilities and services, and beneficial tax policies. Public-sector purchases of goods and services provided important markets for some young firms. The manner in which Cirdenas had reorganized the political institutions (especially the PRI) permitted a considerable measure of control over the labor force through cooptation of its leaders, though there was occasional resort to coercion as well. And, in 1954, after two significant devaluations in less than a decade, the state took steps to damp down inflation: the policy of stabilized development (desarrollo estabilizador) had emerged-a defining characteristic of Mexico's growth strategy into the 1970s. The emerging national bourgeoisie responded quickly to international conditions and government stimuli (though transnational corporations did so too, especially during the 1950s and 60s21). But the context of late, late industrialization threw up new problems that the private sector was unable to meet. In a range of basic industries, the investments that were necessary to sustain the pace of industrialization, and, eventually, to "deepen" it beyond the light consumer industries of the "easy" stage of import substitution, were of such magnitude, high risk, or long-term character that they would not have been made had not the state stepped in. The public-sector banks were the principal instrument for the state's intervention, and the most important of these was Nacional Financiera (NAFIN).22
Founded in 1934 to perform a complex variety of functions, including the development of a stock exchange and a capital market for public bonds, NAFIN was reorganized in December 1940 to make the promotion of industrial development its principal focus. NAFIN rapidly became the major institutional arm of the state's entrepreneurial activities, the instrumentality by which the state's potential power, in relation to a still-maturing national bourgeoisie, became actualized.
NAFIN's influence in shaping the character of state entrepreneurial activities is in large part due to the powerful, relatively autonomous position it has within the government. It has maintained its own financial base through a steady record of earnings (which it has tended to capitalize), through the sale of certificates of participation in the bank's equity investments, and through continuing access to foreign loans (the Ex-Im Bank, for example). The relative autonomy of NAFIN from the tricky currents of Mexican politics is enhanced as well by the close coordination of its activities with the powerful Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico. Representatives from both institutions sit on NAFIN's board of directors, and there is a strong tendency for technical personnel to move among the three institutions, imbuing them with a common outlook. Moreover, there tends to be more continuity of top officials within these institutions than in other ministries and state agencies. Although NAFIN's success and profitability have made it a target for charges that it has intruded into areas that should have been left to the private sector, its entrepreneurial activities have greatly benefited the private sector, and its own equity investments have been centered in those fields and in those projects in which circumstances "placed the minimum effort required well beyond the capacity of the private entrepreneurs and investors of a still newly developing economy":
The larger capital outlays required, the more complex operations which rendered new ventures technically more difficult to launch, and the higher risks deriving from uncertainties of costs and production flows as well as from the greater market imponderables (i.e., greater than those encountered in industrialization to substitute for consumer goods imports)."2
The last-resort character of the interventions of the state into the Mexican economy can be seen in the efforts of NAFIN (and other state institutions) to promote and finance projects of critical importance to national industrialization which were beyond the capabilities of the private sector, but this last-resort character can be seen as well in the Mexican state's willingness to bail out private-sector firms which were on the brink of failure. Although such failures often involve incompetence, they must be seen against the background of the difficulties faced by national entrepreneurs in meeting the demands of import The initiative for Diesel Nacional came originally from two private-sector promoters, Bruno Pagliai and Luis Montes de Oca. Together, and on the basis of studies done by themselves, Fiat and NAFIN, they proposed to manufacture diesel trucks in Mexico using Fiat technology. When these private investors were unable to raise the capital necessary for the venture, they sought publicsector assistance. NAFIN subscribed to 59.5 million pesos of stock; the private investors put in 10.5 million; and Fiat was allotted 6 million as payment for its cooperation and technology.30 Diesel Nacional (DINA), which started operations in 1954, fared poorly. The Fiat truck was ill-adapted to Mexican roads and cargos, the firm was induced to buy expensive and unnecessary machinery from Fiat, and complex problems of distribution were never adequately solved. Efforts to improve sales and profits by domestically assembling automobiles would have caused considerable hardship and would have generated substantial pressures for curative government action; and the failure would have shattered public confidence in the banking system, savings from which were crucial for both public-and private-sector investments. The viability of the entire growth strategy would have been threatened. In taking over SOMEX, the state acquired not only a second major industrial development bank, but also holdings in (a majority position in many) over forty firms.32
The Mexican state's acquisition of unprofitable private sugar mills at an accelerating rate during the 1960s and 1970s would seem to present another example of state sector intervention and expansion resulting from private-sector failure, but this case is more complicated.33
To maintain the low rate of inflation required by the post-1954 policy of desarrollo estabilizador, price controls were instituted on basic commodities.
In 1958 they were placed on sugar. Labor costs in the sugar industry were not so strictly controlled, however, and during the next ten years, labor costs rose 75 percent. The expansion of land under cane cultivation and the adoption of more efficient agricultural methods were somewhat limited by the ejidal character of neighboring lands, which the government was committed (at least to some degree) to protect. Faced with rising costs but unable to expand production or to raise prices, the private mills began to go bankrupt. The state's first response was to create a special state banking institution, the Financiera Nacional Azucarera, to channel investment capital to the industry. When that proved insufficient and the mills continued to lose money, the state, now often the major creditor, stepped in and took them over. A series of efforts to restructure the industry during the 1970s were to no avail. By 1969, eighteen mills (accounting for 30.7 percent of national production) were under government control; by 1975 that number had increased to thirty-one (50.5 percent of national production).
The failures of the private-sector firms were the immediate cause of the state acquisitions in the sugar industry, but those failures were themselves induced by government policies generated by orientations institutionalized in other state agencies aimed at solving other problems of the industrialization strategy, particularly the problem of inflation. Sugar operations became so unattractive that existing owners would not make needed new investments and no buyers could be found for struggling firms. The state stepped in not merely to recover the loans it had made, but also to maintain a major source of rural employment and to boost sugar production, production needed so that domestic demand could be met without upward pressure on prices and so that there would once again be export sales.
We have thus far explored two reasons for direct state intervention: the reticence of the private sector to make needed investments, and the failures of already existing private-sector enterprises. But there are also cases in which 179 This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 24 Aug 2017 21:04:59 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms private-sector investment was available and successful but in which the state intervened nevertheless; they are cases in which the private investment was foreign. Private foreign investment raises special considerations, but not ones that completely deviate from the last-resort character of the interventions of the Mexican state. Earlier we considered a number of state actions towards foreign investors during the Cirdenas regime, arguing that these interventions tended to be triggered by problems (bottlenecks, etc.) that were unlikely to be solved so long as the firms involved remained in foreign hands. After World War II, however, nationalization became a very uncommon response of the Mexican government to foreign investment: "Mexicanization" became the preferred strategy. In order to regulate and control the activities of transnational corporations and to protect and promote the growth of a Mexican national bourgeoisie, foreign investors were first encouraged and then required to share majority ownership (equity) with Mexican partners.34 It has often proved difficult to locate willing and able Mexican private investors for a variety of reasons: the high initial expense of the 51 percent equity, the weak capital market, and differences between the foreign investors and potential Mexican investors with regard to the reinvestment of earnings, etc. Mexican state, but, to an increasing extent, the orientations of these state firms have come to be informed by the very character of the economic activity in which they are engaged, and have displaced last-resort considerations. Shortly after it first began production, Altos Hornos, one of NAFIN's first major projects, began to move towards more fully integrated operations-much in the manner of other major steel companies, public and private, elsewhere in the world. It has moved aggressively to promote ventures guaranteeing it raw material supplies, to add firms that make efficient use of its by-products, and to acquire competitors to consolidate its product liens. Today, Altos Hornos stands at the center of a complex of thirty-eight firms. Another instance of the same pattern: when Chrysler's Mexican subsidiary was compelled under Mexican law to divert majority ownership in its diesel engine manufacturing concern, Motores Perkins, the buyer was state-owned Diesel Nacional (DINA), the other major producer of automotive diesel engines. Not waiting to see if any private investors might be interested in the acquisition, DINA moved swiftly to acquire its competitor. In these cases and in a number of others, state firms acquired for last-resort reasons have themselves intervened in the economy for quite different purposes, acting much in the manner of private firms in the same line of business.
Finally, political factors have also been important in reshaping the orientations of state enterprises. Though they are difficult to document, there surely are instances of acquisitions and expansions by state firms whose top officials are seeking to enhance their power and prestige in political circles. Just as surely, there are instances of the use of public office for personal profit, and these, too, alter the state's orientations. Perhaps still more important are personnel changes, particularly those that come at the sexennial change of administration. A variety of factors, including continuities among lower-level tecnicos, limit how dramatic the resultant change in orientation may be, but some significant redirection has taken place. SOMEX, for example, went produces a state that is oriented to and capable of fulfilling those tasks.
Speaking rather broadly, we can identify two sorts of strategies for explaining why the state acts as it does. Exogenous explanations see the state as responding merely to pressures applied on it externally by groups, classes, or class factions.
Group theory explanations are of this sort" and (notwithstanding considerable differences) "instrumentalist" Marxist approaches tend to favor this exogenous strategy.38 Endogenous explanatory strategies, on the other hand, understand the state as having orientations of its own that guide its action from within.
"Structuralist" Marxist explanations are predominantly of this sort,39 as are "bureaucratic politics" approaches40 (though these are theoretically much more rudimentary and short-term in character). There can be no question of choosing a priori between these two explanatory strategies, though one or the other may be more important in particular cases. Neither the "bureaucratic politics" approach nor the structuralist-Marxist approach can be relied upon for an understanding of how the state's own orientations arise, however. The former merely takes these as given. The latter views the state as acting in accord with an internal logic that arises from the need for an institution to resolve the contradictions of capitalist production, particularly those that arise between the various factions of the capitalist class; but, like Gerschenkron, the structuralist approach risks falling into the functionalist error (the orientation is called forth simply by the need), and it has tended to be excessively abstract and inattentive to the specific shape those contradictions take in a particular society.41 to deal with it. Whether or not the state will respond will itself be shaped by already existing orientations. Acting on the basis of orientations that have already been taken on and institutionalized within the state apparatus, new problems thrust upon the state will be defined in certain ways and institutional mechanisms created or adapted to deal with them. In Mexico, an initial set of last-resort orientations towards problems of savings and investment were institutionalized in a complex of state-sector financial institutions. In the face of private-sector difficulties in certain key sectors, the state intervened, creating enterprises in fields as diverse as steel and fertilizers, and taking over enterprises engaged in dozens of other endeavors.
NAFIN, to take one interesting example, was originally created out of the continuing concern of the state to develop an adequate financial system; it was particularly charged with the development of a stock and bond market. But as the international economy changed (due to the Great Depression and World War II) and import substitution industrialization became both a necessity and an opportunity, NAFIN was reorganized to serve as an industrial development bank. The orientation that came to guide the bank during the 1940s has more or less continued to inform its activities, though there have been some changes (a greater concern with regional development and with small businesses, for example). As the state has acquired or created various industrial enterprisesAtenquique, DINA, etc.-in response to problems of private-sector incapability or failure, new organisms have been added to the state, with their own distinctive tasks and orientations, and these institutionally based orientations have thus been added to the state's repertoire. Altos Hornos and SOMEX were acquired by the state acting out of last-resort considerations, but these state enterprises themselves, acting in response to their own problems, needs, and guiding orientations have acquired or initiated other ventures in ways that move beyond last-resort considerations strictly defined, often paralleling the orientations of private-sector firms in the same industry. Hence, Altos Homos's expansion for vertical integration, or DINA's acquisition of Motores Perkins.
In other instances, political ambitions on the part of directors of state enterprises have generated expansions or acquisitions by these firms in situations that cannot be seen to be limited to last-resort considerations. The definition ofproblems. Understanding the orientations of the state helps us to move beyond the incompleteness of Gerschenkron's account in its descriptive character; it allows us to understand how such central terms as "problem" are defined historically. Although many of Mexico's problems had a certain "objective" character which would make them recognizable in other developing countries (the problem of rapid capital accumulation, balance-ofpayment deficits, etc.), we also saw how such problems were historically defined by the particular political dynamics and ideological currents in Mexico.
The political decision to accept a stabilization program and orthodox monetary policy in the early 1950s, for example, led to another political decision to control sugar prices. Coupled with a political decision to let wages rise in the industry, a situation was created where the private sector became unwilling to invest in sugar production. This created political problems (unemployment in sugar regions, popular-sector unrest if the prices of basic commodities were not kept low) and an economic problem (loss of export revenue). The state responded by taking over the sugar mills. Another example: it was the political definition of foreign investment as a problem and of Mexicanization as a solution that induced "last-resort" state purchases of equity in TNC subsidiaries.
The question of state power State intervention into the economy of late dependent industrialization does not depend simply on prerequisites needing to be filled or problems that would be left unsolved if left to private-sector institutional arrangements. The state must have thepower to intervene and a full explanation must take power as a variable, not a given. We have argued that the Mexican state had the power to act as a banker and entrepreneur because of the way in which strong political institutions were created after the Revolution and because of the weak and disorganized nature of the private sector at this time. Further, certain factors stemming from Mexico companies.
These few remarks are only meant to be suggestive. This paper has been principally concerned with the problem of orientations, and we are far from presenting a full explanation of the growth, maintenance, and limits of the power of the Mexican state. We might close, however, by touching on very current matters which any such explanation would have to take into consideration-two factors placing increasingly stiff limits on the power of the Mexican state to intervene in the economy.
One is increasing resistance from the very national bourgeoisie the state helped to create. Sometimes this resistance has taken dramatic, public form, such as the determined opposition that President Echeverria faced from the state economic activities engineered by the Echeverria regime. Inflation and a fast-growing debt service constituted new problems, however. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and private transnational banks, Mexico was forced to devalue twice in the last months of 1976 and had to make promises to restrain governmental expenditures. The internal pressures of the national bourgeoisie compounded by the external pressures set by foreign indebtedness have created a contradiction: the ability of the state to continue to act as an institution of last resort, while at the same time following a policy of primary reliance on the private sector, seems to be severely threatened at this point in Mexican history. NOTES *The theoretical arguments in this paper benefited greatly from ongoing collaborative work w Dr. Morris J. Blachman. The skillful research assistance of Bonnie Sharpe was importa collecting the case data used for this paper. Funding from the following foundations made p the larger research project of which this paper is a part: the Tinker Foundation, the Social S Research Council, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Doherty Foundatio the National Endowment for the Humanities.
